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Abstract Quality of life is often measured using questions about happiness. This method
presumes that respondents are able to judge their life. Research suggest that this is typically
the case, but this is not to say that everybody can. In that context one may doubt whether
people with a mental disorder can judge their life adequately. Happiness can be rejected as
a indicator for quality of life for people with mental disorders, because of affective and
cognitive distortions. We therefore checked the validity of happiness and satisfaction
measures in the context of mental disorders. Psychiatric diagnoses were determined at
baseline and at 12 and 36 months follow-up in a representative sample (N = 7,076) of the
Dutch population, using a full Composite International Diagnostic Interview. Respondents
indicated how often they had felt happy during the past month and how satisfied they were
with their lives in general. The measurements have a satisfactory concurrent, ecological
and predictive validity for people with mental disorders. Though the level of happiness is
lower among the people with mental disorders, conditions for happiness and contentment
appear to be similar.
Keywords Happiness  Mental disorders  Life satisfaction  Quality of life 
Validity of happiness measure  Positive mood  Mood disorder  Anxiety disorder 
Substance abuse disorder
1 Introduction
Utilitarianism is the philosophy of life that is based on the idea that that we should seek the
greatest happiness for the greatest number (Bentham 1789–1907). On a societal level this
idea is gaining momentum. For example, the indicator Gross National Happiness is used as
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a goal for development in Bhutan. In 1971 the former king Jigme Singye Wangchuck
famously stated that ‘Gross National Happiness is more important than Gross National
Product’ (Priesner 1999, 28). In the West, the same idea is propagated by noted scholars
such as Kahneman et al. (1997) and Layard (2005). The idea is that happiness could be
used to guide government decisions and for example to choose between rising inflation and
unemployment or between more money and less airport noise (Loewenstein and Ubel
2008).
A corner stone of applied utilitarianism is the idea that we can measure happiness in the
general population adequately. Several authors defend the position that happiness measures
are valid (e.g. Veenhoven 2009), but there is an aspect in the discussion that has not
received adequate attention. For people with mental disorders it is claimed that happiness
is not a useful indicator for the quality of life, because their moods tend to reflect altered
psychological states and not the objective circumstances of their lives (Katschnig 2006;
Katschnig et al. 2006; Atkinson et al. 1997; Gill and Feinstein 1994). For example, the
subjective experience of life is more negative in depression than outsiders consider jus-
tified (Kay et al. 1964), and the patients themselves agree with the outsiders once they have
recovered from the acute episode of their illness (Morgado et al. 1991). Katschnig et al.
(2006) state that mood is distorted in mental disorders by psychopathological fallacies of
an affective, cognitive and reality distortion nature.
The distortions mentioned can be relevant for survey research, because mental disorders
are common in general population (e.g. Baumeister and Ha¨rter 2007). In the Dutch sample
we used for our study, 41.2% of the respondents had a lifetime prevalence of at least one
DSM-III-R disorder at T0. For the prevalence of mental disorders during the past month
the prevalence was 16.5% (Bijl et al. 1998a).
In addition to this, it has become clear that the severest forms of unhappiness are usually
associated with mental disorders. In a Dutch sample 84.6% of the people who had never or
rarely felt happy during the past 4 weeks, had (a history of) a mental disorder (Bergsma
et al. in press a). Life time prevalence is mentioned, because psychopathology is associated
with the residual functional disability even if a disorder is cured or in remission (Bijl and
Ravelli 2000).
In this paper we try to assess how serious the psychopathological fallacies are for survey
research on happiness. Are the distortions so serious that people with mental disorders are
less able to judge their own levels of happiness and satisfaction? Of the three fallacies
mentioned, we think that the affective and cognitive are most relevant for survey research
in the general population. Reality distortion (psychosis) is quite rare and it is not very
likely that people will be recruited for survey research when psychotic symptoms are florid.
The impact of affective and cognitive fallacies can be assessed by research on the
affective and cognitive indicators of quality of life. Happiness is often considered to be an
affective evaluation of the quality of life, whereas life satisfaction is an evaluation with a
stronger cognitive component (Veenhoven 2009). This leads to three research questions:
1. What is the impact of mental disorders on average happiness and life satisfaction
ratings in the general population?
2. Is a single item happiness measure valid in the context of mental disorders? In
answering this question we also answer the question how serious the affective
distortions are and what makes people with mental disorders happy.
3. Is it possible to detect signs of a cognitive psychopathological fallacy that renders life-
satisfactions measures less useful for people with mental disorders?
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2 Method
2.1 Respondents
The Netherlands Mental Health Survey and Incidence Study (NEMESIS) is a study on the
prevalence, incidence, course and outcome of psychiatric disorders in a representative
sample (N = 7,076) of the general population aged 18–64 (Bijl et al. 1998b). The study is
based on a sample of 90 Dutch municipalities, with the stratification of criteria urban
residence and adequate distribution over the 12 Dutch provinces. The second step was to
draw a sample of private households from post office registers. The number of households
selected in each municipality was determined by its population size. The third step was to
choose which individuals to interview.
The selected households were sent a letter of introduction signed by the national
minister of public health asking them to take part. Shortly thereafter they were contacted
by telephone by the interviewers. Households with no telephone or unlisted numbers (18%)
were visited in person. In each household, the member with the most recent birthday was
selected, on the condition that (s) he was between 18 and 64 years and sufficiently fluent in
Dutch to be interviewed. Persons who were not immediately available, due to travel,
hospitalization or imprisonment, were contacted later. To establish contact, the inter-
viewers made a minimum of ten phone calls or visits to a given address at different times
of the day and week. These procedures were approved by the ethics committee of the
Netherlands Institute of Mental Health and Addiction.
In the initial data collection phase, from February through December 1996, 7,076
persons were interviewed. The response rate was 69.7%. The participants in the survey
reflected well the Dutch population in terms of gender, civil status and urban residence.
The 18–24 age group was underrepresented (Bijl et al. 1998b). All participants in the
baseline interview were approached for follow-up. As at T0, if necessary the interviewers
made at least ten phone calls or visits at various times of the day and week. Of the 7,076
persons who had taken part at T0, 5,618 were interviewed 12 months later at T1 (response
79.4%) and of these 4,796 subjects were interviewed 2 years later at T2 (response 85.4%)
(De Graaf et al. 2000).
2.2 Mental Disorder
The Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI), Version 1.1 (computerized
version) (Robins et al. 1989) was used to determine mental disorders. The CIDI is a
structured interview that was developed by the World Health Organization (Wittchen et al.
1991) and is based on the Diagnostic Interview Schedule (DIS) and the Present State
Examination (PSE). It is designed for use by trained interviewers who are not clinicians.
CIDI 1.1 contains two diagnostic programs to compute diagnoses according to the criteria
and definitions of either DSM-III-R or ICD-10. The CIDI is now being used worldwide,
and WHO field trials have documented acceptable reliability and validity (e.g. Wittchen
1994). The following DSM-III-R diagnoses are recorded in NEMESIS: mood disorders
(depression, dysthymia, bipolar disorder), anxiety disorders (panic disorder, agoraphobia,
simple phobia, social phobia, generalized anxiety disorder, obsessive–compulsive disorder)
psychoactive substance use disorders (alcohol or drug abuse and dependence, including
sedatives, hypnotics and anxiolytics), eating disorders, schizophrenia and other non-
affective psychotic disorders. In our analysis we used the 1-month prevalence of disorders.
We excluded the people with eating disorders (N = 20) and schizophrenia (N = 5) from
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our sample, because the number of the people affected were too low to have sufficient
statistical power.
2.3 Happiness
Happiness was measured using a single question taken from the Short-Form-36 Health
Survey (SF-36) (Ware and Sherbourne, 1992) about the frequency of happy moods during
the past 4 weeks. The (reversed) scale ranged from 1 = never felt happy, 2 = rarely felt
happy, 3 = sometimes felt happy, 4 = often felt happy, 5 = usually felt happy, until
6 = always felt happy. Our measurement tried to tap Daniel Kahneman’s (2000) notion of
‘objective happiness’, which is the ‘raw’ affective experience that underlies the overall
evaluation of life, because answers to questions about the subjective evaluation of life as a
whole are more vulnerable to distortions.
2.4 Life-Satisfaction
Satisfaction was measured with questions starting with: ‘how satisfied or dissatisfied are
you with your …’ and ended with ‘most important activity’, ‘relationships with friends’,
‘family life’, ‘recreation’, ‘current housing’, ‘income’, and ‘life in general’. The (reversed)
scale ranged from 1 = very dissatisfied, 2 = rather dissatisfied, 3 = neither satisfied or
dissatisfied, 4 = rather satisfied, 5 = very satisfied. We also used one items from the
Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (Rosenberg 1965) that asks: ‘taking all together I am satisfied
with myself’. The reversed scale for this item ranged from 1 = totally disagree,
2 = disagree, 3 = agree, 4 = totally agree. When we present data about life-satisfaction
next to data about happiness we transformed the scores and to a six point scale, for ease of
comparison. This measurements were used to evaluate the potential cognitive distortions in
the context of mental disorders.
2.5 Socio-Demographic Variables
We included age, gender, educational attainment, cohabitation status; living with a partner
or not, irrespective of children, employment status; in paid employment or not, and degree
of urban living (rural = municipalities with fewer than 500 addresses per square kilometer;
urban = larger municipalities).
2.6 Mental Ill-Being
General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12) has been developed as a screener for non-psy-
chotic mental disorders in the general population. It provides a general measure of mental
ill-being, independent of the specific psychiatric diagnosis (Koeter and Ormel 1991). In our
analyses we used the sum score, which indicates the seriousness of mental health problems.
The internal reliability of this questionnaire in our research cohort was satisfactory
(Cronbach’s a = 0.85).
2.7 Mastery
Locus of control was assessed with the 5-item Mastery Scale (Rotter 1966), with high
scores on mastery corresponding to an internal locus of control. The internal reliability of
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this questionnaire in our research cohort was satisfactory (Cronbach’s a = 0.81). This
measurement was included in our analyses because it is known that mastery has a high
correlation with happiness, and we expected that mental disorders have a negative impact
on mastery.
2.8 Neuroticism
Neuroticism was assessed with the Groninger Neuroticism Questionnaire containing 14
items (Ormel 1980). The internal reliability of the questionnaire in our research cohort was
satisfactory (Cronbach’s a = 0.80). A higher score indicates higher levels of neuroticism.
Neuroticism is included in our analyses, because personality factors are among the
strongest and most predictive factors associated with happiness (Diener et al. 1999).
2.9 Self-Esteem
We assessed self-esteem with the 10-item Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (Rosenberg 1965).
A high score indicates high self-esteem (Cronbach a = 0.86). This measurement was
included because of the expected correlation with both happiness and mental disorders.
2.10 Analyses
Our research questions were addressed using descriptive analyses, with the help of SPSS
16.0. We obtained the correlations between our happiness measures and other variables. In
Tables 2, 3, 4, 5 we used kendall’s tau_b. When we assessed the validity of our happiness
measure for people without mental disorders, we first used the data collected in the World
Database of Happiness (Veenhoven 2010) as a comparison. Then we assessed if our
happiness measure behaved as could be expected based on existing literature for people
without mental disorders and then for people with mental disorders. We assessed the
congruent, ecological and predictive validity.
In Tables 1 and 3 our happiness variable was dichotomized in infrequent happy moods
(1, 2, 3) and frequent happy moods (felt at least often happy, 4, 5, 6). When we assessed if
the correlations for people with and without mental disorders differed significantly, we
used Fischer r-to-z transformations.
3 Results
3.1 Question 1: The Impact of Mental Disorders on Average Happiness
and Life Satisfaction
Average happiness at T0 (N = 7,069) in our sample from the general population was 4.77
(SD 1.06) and average life satisfaction (N = 7,075) was 5.13 (SD 0.94). As expected
happiness and life-satisfaction are lower for people with mental disorders. The average
happiness for people with mental disorders (N = 1,135) is 4.12 (SD 1.35) and average life-
satisfaction (N = 1,137) is 4.55 (SD 1.24). If we excluded people with 1-month mental
disorders from our sample, the average happiness and life satisfaction was higher. Average
happiness for the general population without mental disorders (N = 5,934) is 4.90 (SD
0.95) and average life satisfaction for this group (N = 5,938) is 5.24 (SD 0.83).
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3.1.1 Discussion
As expected the exclusion of people with mental disorders from our sample, led to higher
average happiness and life-satisfaction. The difference was modest. In percentages, hap-
piness was raised by 2, 7 and life-satisfaction by 2, 1%. This may indicate that people with
mental disorders do not disturb survey ratings of happiness and life-satisfaction, but we
think that it is too early for such a conclusion.
The average happiness and life-satisfaction of people with mental disorders is not very
low. This could mean that the affective and cognitive psychopathological fallacies may not
only make people dissatisfied and unhappy without an objective base in the circumstances
of life. It also could be that some people with mental disorders report unwarranted levels of
happiness and satisfaction that may be the result from lacking insight in their own situa-
tion. Again this could seriously hamper the reliability of survey results, so we checked the
validity of our happiness and life-satisfaction measure.
3.2 Question 2: The Validity of Happiness Measures in the Context of Mental
Disorders
Mental disorders are not synonymous with deep unhappiness. Table 1 shows the per-
centages of people with different mental disorders at T0 that report to have been happy at
least often. Notably people with pure anxiety disorders and substance abuse disorders
report frequent happy moods.
Table 1 Happiness during the past 4 weeks among people with mental disorders
Mental disorder during
previous month
N Percentage that felt
at least often happy
during the last
4 weeks (CI 95%)
Pure cases N Percentage that felt
at least often happy
during the last
4 weeks (CI 95%)
No disorder 5934 89.1 (88.3–89.9)
Any disorder 1104 66.6 (63.8–69.4) 781 76.1 (73.1–79.0)
Any mood disorder 282 30 (24–35) 102 37 (28–47)
Major depression 185 22 (16–28) 55 29 (17–41)
Bipolar disorder 42 43 (27–58) 17 53 (26–79)
Dysthymia 127 32 (24–41) 30 43 (25–62)
Any anxiety disorder 691 66 (62–69) 426 80 (76–84)
Panic disorder 103 42 (32–51) 29 79 (64–95)
Agoraphobia 77 62 (51–73) 27 78 (61–95)
Social phobia 263 60 (54–66) 121 76 (68–84)
Simple phobia 399 69 (65–74) 231 84 (79–89)
Generalized anxiety disorder 54 50 (36–64) 13 54 (22–85)
Obsessive compulsive disorder 19 32 (9–55) 5 60 (0–100)
Any abuse or dependency 334 76 (71–81) 253 85 (81–90)
Alcohol abuse 139 90 (85–95) 119 94 (90–98)
Alcohol dependence 164 69 (62–76) 115 81 (74–88)
Drug abuse 14 71 (44–99) 5 80 (24–100)
Drug dependence 36 50 (33–67) 14 50 (20.0–80.0)
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A first indication for the validity of our happiness measure is that happiness reports
reflect the clinical characteristics of the disorder. People report lower happiness if they
have more serious conditions. For example, people abusing substances or alcohol are
happier than people being dependent. In the anxiety disorders, the simple phobia is
associated with most frequent happy moods and the obsessive compulsive and generalized
anxiety disorders are associated with least frequent happy moods. In the mood disorders,
dysthymia is associated with more frequent happy moods than a major depressive disorder.
Table 1 also shows that people with pure disorders are happier than people with more than
one disorder.
One possible explanation for the frequent happy moods of people with mental disorders
is that they have lowered their standards for happiness, so that they might describe their
mood as happy, although in reality their moods are low. If this were the case, we would
expect that people with more chronic conditions, would show clearer signs of adaptation to
low moods and report higher levels of happiness. We compared people with any mental
disorder during T2 according to their history during earlier measurements at T0 and T1. In
this sample, the people without mental disorders at T0 or T1 (N = 157) reported an
average happiness of 4.1 (95% CI. 3.9–4.3). The people with any mental disorder during
T0 or T1 (N = 125) reported an average happiness of 3, 7 (95% CI. 3.5–4.0), and the
people with any mental during both T0 and T1 (N = 102) reported 3.6 (95% CI. 3.3–3.9).
Happiness was lower for people who were diagnosed more often as having a mental
disorder, i.e. those who had a more chronic condition. This seems to indicate that more
frequent happiness is not a sign of lowering standards and adaptation, but an indication that
the condition is less serious.
3.3 Congruent Validity
We assessed at T0 if our happiness measure is correlated with other measurements in the
way that could be expected on the basis of existing literature. We first focused on people
without mental disorders. This yielded the expected results (Table 2). For example, people
who are satisfied with life and family relationships, who feel vivacious and relaxed, and do
not suffer from loneliness report higher levels of happiness. The same is true for people
with high levels of self-esteem and mastery, and low levels of mental ill-being and
neuroticism.
The congruent validity of our happiness measure seemed valid for people without
mental disorders. When we repeated the procedure with people with mental disorders, we
got essentially the same results, with one meaningful difference (Table 3). The correlations
are higher for people with mental disorders than for people without mental disorders. The
difference between the correlations coefficients was significant.
We tested if the difference was an artifact of the skewness of the distribution of our
happiness measure. Therefore we created a new happiness variable that was corrected for
the (mild) negative skewed distribution (-1.11), but this did not result in a significant
moderation of the differences in the correlations between the groups with and without
mental disorders.
3.4 Ecological Validity
The existing literature indicates that objective circumstances explain a small part of the
variation in happiness, and this is what we noticed in our sample at T0 as well. Factors such
as gender, household income, level of education are very modestly correlated with
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happiness. The objective circumstances explain little variance in happiness. This is true for
people with and without mental disorders. The differences between the two groups are
sometimes significant, but so small that we did not try to interpret the difference.
To further assess the ecological validity of our happiness measure for people with
mental disorders, we focused on indicators for the seriousness of one’s disorder. Happier
respondents with mental disorders had less days absent from work because of the mental
disorder (Kendall tau-b = -0.25, P \ 0.01), used less sleeping pills (Kendall tau-b = -
0.17, P \ 0.01), less anti-depressives (Kendall tau-b = -0.15, P \ 0.01), less tranquil-
lizers (Kendall tau-b = -0.16, P \ 0.01), and less pain killers (Kendall tau-b = -0.10,
P \ 0.01).
3.5 Predictive Validity
Frequent happy moods at T0 reduces the chances of having a mental disorder 1 year later
at T1. This was true for people with mental disorders at T0 (Kendall tau-b = 0.19,
P \ 0.01) and for people without mental disorders at T0 (Kendall tau-b = 0.07, P \ 0.01).
The difference in the correlations was again significant (P \ 0.01). Table 3 shows the
chances of having a mental disorder at T1 for different groups.
Table 2 Correlates of happiness
among people with and without
mental disorders
* P \ 0.05 (two tailed)
** P \ 0.01 (two tailed)
Characteristic No disorder
previous
month
Any disorder
previous
month
Difference
in correlations
Single items
Life satisfaction 0.39** 0.53** 0.14**
Satisfaction with
family life
0.36** 0.41** 0.06*
Felt did something
meaningful lately?
0.13** 0.27** 0.14**
Felt lonely -0.19** -0.33** 0.14**
Felt vivacious 0.40** 0.48** 0.08**
Felt calm, relaxed 0.40** 0.47** 0.07**
Questionnaires
Self-esteem 0.272** 0.345** 0.07*
Neuroticism -0.31** -0.46** 0.15**
Mastery 0.26** 0.39** 0.13**
Mental ill-being -0.30** -0.45** 0.15**
Table 3 Course of any mental disorder among people with and without frequent feelings of happiness at
baseline (T0)
No disorder at T1 Any disorder at T1
N = 4756 (%) N = 836 (%)
No frequent happy moods at T0 89.3 57.7
At least often happy at T0 96.2 75.4
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3.5.1 Discussion
In this part of the study we checked if affective psychopathological fallacies that comes
with mental disorders render happiness ratings less valid. We can reject this idea on four
grounds. The first is that happiness reflects clinical characteristics of mental disorders.
People diagnosed as having a mental disorder report less happiness than people without,
and more serious disorders are associated with less happiness. Other indicators of the
severity of mental disorders such as the chronic nature of the disorder and the existence of
comorbid mental disorder are also negatively correlated with happy moods.
The congruent validity, ecological and predictive validity of happiness is satisfactory in
the context of mental disorders. The same psychological factors that are associated with
happiness in the general population are correlated with happiness for people with mental
disorders. More frequent happy moods predict the recovery from mental disorders 1 year
later. Sociodemographic factors that are largely uncorrelated with happiness for people
without mental disorders, are also not, or very modestly, correlated with happiness for
people with mental disorders.
There was however one meaningful difference between the people with and without
mental disorders. Psychological factors show a significantly higher correlation with hap-
piness for people with mental disorders than for people without mental disorders. This
suggests that people with mental disorders have a higher sensitivity for psychological
problems that can harm their moods.
Among people with mental disorders, those with high self-esteem, who feel in control of
their lives, who feel vivacious, relaxed and have high emotional stability (low neuroti-
cism), who are satisfied with life and family relationships, and have less symptoms of
psychological ill-health are most likely to experience frequent happy moods. The level of
happiness is lowered in mental disorders, but conditions of happiness are the same for
people with and without mental disorders.
3.6 Question 3: The Validity of Life-Satisfaction Measures in the Context
of Mental Disorders
In the introduction we mentioned that research has shown that the subjective experience of
life is more negative in mental disorders than outsiders consider justified. The direct way to
check if this is true is showing that the relationships between life satisfaction and the
objective circumstances of life are significant for people without mental disorders, and
more modest or not significant for people with disorders. The problem with this approach is
that life-satisfaction of people without disorders is very modestly correlated with actual
circumstances. The same is true for people with mental disorders (Table 4). The exceptions
are pay status of a job and gender. In general, we can conclude that the variance in life-
satisfaction in The Netherlands cannot be explained with the help of the objective cir-
cumstances, and this as true for people with as for people without mental disorders.
Another test of the validity of the life-satisfaction measure is to assess how it correlates
with satisfactions with life domains. A cognitive psychopathological fallacy could disturb
the coherence of ratings. However, people with and without mental disorders showed the
same coherence in judging their life-satisfaction (Table 5). There was no difference in the
amount of variance explained, but for the different groups different aspects weighted more.
For people with mental disorders the correlation with general life-satisfaction was higher
for satisfaction with themselves and with recreation. For people without mental disorders
the correlation was higher for satisfaction with income and with current housing.
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The satisfaction with life of people with mental disorder do not show a clear sign of
cognitive fallacies. This results runs counter to the message of Katschnig that self-rated
happiness and satisfaction is the result of psychopathology. This might be due to the fact
that Katschnig reports from clinical samples and we from the general population. We
therefore specifically looked at the life-satisfaction of the people with lowest levels of
happiness. For people that report to have been happy never, seldom of sometimes during
the past 4 weeks, we do get a significant difference between people with and without a
disorder if we calculate the correlation (kendall tau-b) between happiness and life satis-
faction. For unhappy people without a disorder, the association between life-satisfaction
and happiness is 0.14 (P \ 0.01), whereas the association between life-satisfaction and
happiness is 0.45 (P \ 0.01) for unhappy people with mental disorders. The difference is
significant (P \ 0.01).
3.6.1 Discussion
The coherence of satisfaction with life domains and general life satisfaction for people with
and without mental disorders indicate that measures of life-satisfaction are useful for
Table 4 Correlates of general life-satisfaction and sociodemographic characteristics of people with and
without mental disorders
Characteristic No disorder
previous month
Any disorder
previous month
Difference in
correlations
Gender (male = 0, female = 1) 0.09** 0.00 -0.09**
Age -0.02 -0.07* 0.05
Urbanization 0.06** 0.07* 0.01
Living alone or with others 0.18** 0.20** 0.02
Household income 0.14** 0.19** 0.05
Paid job 0.02 0.11** 0.09**
Level of education -0.03 -0.06 0.03
Had sex during past year 0.13** 0.15** 0.02
* P \ 0.05 (two tailed)
** P \ 0.01 (two tailed)
Table 5 Correlates of general life-satisfaction with satisfaction on different domains of life among people
with and without mental disorders
Satisfaction with No disorder
previous month
Any disorder
previous month
Difference in
correlations
Family life 0.45** 0.47** 0.02
Most important activity 0.37** 0.40** 0.03
Relationships with friends 0.36** 0.34** -0.02
Recreation 0.33** 0.40** 0.07*
Income 0.33** 0.26** -0.07*
Myself 0.29** 0.43** 0.14**
Current housing 0.26** 0.16** -0.10
* P \ 0.05 (two tailed)
** P \ 0.01 (two tailed)
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people. The cognitive psychopathological fallacies for people with mental disorders are not
so strong that the life-satisfaction measures are incoherent. The almost absent correlation
between life-satisfaction and objective life circumstances for people with and without
mental disorders, also indicate that there are no good reasons to distrust the self-reports of
people with mental disorders.
There is however ground for the observations mentioned in the introduction. People
with mental disorders that are unhappy, are more dissatisfied with life than unhappy people
without disorders. We think that this indicates that people with mental disorders are less
able to distance themselves from their dominant moods. When they feel low, they are more
dissatisfied with life, whereas unhappy people without disorders are able to correct their
judgements for this affective bias. This is an importance difference, that is clinically
significant, but we do not believe that we can conclude that we should regard this as a
cognitive fallacy that renders life-satisfaction measures useless.
4 General discussion
4.1 Happiness and Life Satisfaction Ratings in Surveys can be Used For Everyone
The fact that mental disorders are common in the general population does not rule out the
possibility to use survey question about happiness or life-satisfaction. The existence of
mental disorders has a very modest impact on average happiness ratings in the general
population, and we could find no indication that affective of cognitive psychopathological
fallacies make the measures less trustworthy.
4.2 Happiness Measures are Valid for People with Mental Disorders
Our single item happiness rating shows satisfactory congruent, ecological and predictive
validity for people with and without mental disorders. The same psychological factors that
are associated with happiness for people without mental disorders, are associated with
happiness for people with mental disorders. The conditions of happiness are the same for
people with and without mental disorders, but the conditions are relatively more important
for people with disorders.
4.3 Life-Satisfaction is a Useful Indicator for Quality of Life for People with Mental
Disorders
We could not find signs that a cognitive psychopathological fallacy rendered the life-
satisfaction ratings less useful for people with mental disorders compared to those without
disorders.
4.4 More Sensitivity
We interpret the fact that happiness of people with mental disorders is more sensitive to
psychological factors, as a logical consequence of the diathesis-stress theory of mental
disorders (e.g. Monroe and Simons 1991). The theory states people can have a specific
vulnerability to develop a disorder and that the disorders occurs is stressors exceed the
coping mechanisms.
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People without mental disorders are less sensitive, and psychological factors such as
less self-esteem, less mastery and more neuroticism, have a smaller negative influence on
their happiness and life-satisfaction ratings, compared to people with disorders. People
with mental disorders experience more stress and every added problem therefore has a
stronger impact. Unhappy people with low moods are more likely to be satisfied with life,
probably because they are better able to correct their cognitive judgment for current
affective influences.
4.5 Practical Implications
Our findings have two important practical implications. The first is that we have found no
reason to exclude happiness or life-satisfaction ratings of people with mental disorders in
surveys in the general population. The happiness ratings of people with mental disorders in
the general population are as valid as those of people without disorders.
The second implication is for positive psychology that seeks to improve positive psy-
chological functioning. The natural target group for positive psychology interventions
(Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi 2000) seem to be the people with mental disorders. They
are least happy and show most room for improvement (Bergsma et al. in press b), and they
might be most sensitive for enhancement of positive psychological factors. On the basis of
our data we expect that interventions that raise self-esteem and mastery, and lower neu-
roticism and psychological ill-being, will give a higher return in gained happiness for
people with mental disorders, because of the higher association of these factors with
happiness. Helping people to find paid employment also can have a higher impact on
happiness for the people with mental disorders.
We therefore agree with a pamphlet of the London School of Economics (2006) with
the title The depression report; A New Deal for Depression and Anxiety Disorders. From
an utilitarian point of view, the authors came to the conclusion that we should train an army
of psychotherapists to raise happiness.
4.6 Limitations
We used a measure of happiness that directly referred to dominant moods. In the literature
about happiness another definition is more common. Veenhoven (1984, 22–24) defines
happiness as ‘‘the degree to which an individual judges the overall quality of his life-as-a-
whole favorably’’. In our data we did not have any data to study this concept of happiness.
This form of happiness is considered to be built up by affects and thoughts, or moods and
contentment with (domains of) life. In our study we were able to assess the validity of the
components of overall happiness, but we did not study how people with and without mental
disorders combined the two sources of information to judge their own overall happiness.
This question warrants further study.
A second limitation is that we analysed the answers of people with mental disorders in a
general survey. People with the most serious mental disorders, such as schizophrenia, are
underrepresented in our sample. For the most severe forms of mental disorders the psy-
chopathological fallacies mentioned by Katschnig are probably more important. Our
results are relevant for general surveys, but not necessarily for clinical studies on quality of
life with people with most severe forms of psychopathology.
A. Bergsma et al.
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